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The dynamics of informal health markets in marginalised regions are relevant to policy discourse in
India, but are poorly understood. We examine how informal health markets operate from the viewpoint
of informal providers (those without any government-recognised medical degrees, otherwise known as
RMPs) by drawing upon data from a household survey in 2002, a provider census in 2004 and ongoing
ﬁeld observations from a research site in Koppal district, Karnataka, India. We ﬁnd that despite their
illegality, RMPs depend on government and private providers for their training and referral networks.
Buffeted by unregulated market pressures, RMPs are driven to provide allopathic commodities regardless
of need, but can also be circumspect in their practice. Though motivated by proﬁt, their socially
embedded practice at community level at times undermines their ability to ensure payment of fees for
their services. In addition, RMPs feel that communities can threaten them via violence or malicious
rumours, leading them to seek political favour and social protection from village elites and elected
representatives. RMPs operate within negotiated quid pro quo bargains that lead to tenuous reciprocity
or fragile trust between them and the communities in which they practise. In the context of this ‘unfree’
market, some RMPs reported being more embedded in health systems, more responsive to communities
and more vulnerable to unregulated market pressures than others. Understanding the heterogeneity,
nuanced motivations and the embedded social relations that mark informal providers in the health
systems, markets and communities they work in, is critical for health system reforms.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
The current policy thrust towards universal health care in India
(HLEG, 2011) is premised on the participation of adequate numbers
of skilled health providers who operate within a unifying regu-
latory framework. However, qualiﬁed providers are unevenly dis-
tributed geographically, with remote rural areas and urban slums
particularly underserved (Gangolli, Duggal, & Shukla, 2005; NCMH,
2005; Rao, Rao, Shiva Kumar, Chatterjee, & Sundararaman, 2011).
Many of the providers who do work in these marginalised regions
lack government-recognised medical degrees and are known in
India as RMPs (acronym discussed in further detail later). In India,
although only registered providers are allowed to practice, poor
regulatory enforcement allows RMPs to enterprisingly ﬁll an
informal market for curative allopathic treatment. The dynamics ofblic Health, Johns Hopkins
Y-NC-ND license.these informal health markets, which shape the behaviour and
practice of RMPs as well as the dependence on them in marginal-
ised regions, are relevant to the policy discourse, but are at present
poorly understood.
In this paper, we examine how informal health markets operate
from the viewpoint of RMPs in northern Karnataka, India. By
drawing upon sociological literature onmarkets and empirical data,
we describe the varied motivations, social relations and linkages
(with formal health providers and the community) that underpin
RMP practice. In doing so, we contribute insights to an emergent
literature on the institutional context of informal service provision,
which is relevant to the policy discourse in India and to margin-
alised populations accessing informal health markets the world
over.
Literature review
In economics, markets are seen as arenas for the exchange of
goods and services in which buyers and sellers participate to
maximise their interests. However, economic sociologists like new
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being contingent on social relations, structures and norms. In
addition, economic sociologists ﬁnd problematic the separation of
human behaviour into mutually exclusive spheres, deﬁned as self-
interested market relations versus political social relations
(Swedberg, 1994). They argue that economic goals can be pursued
in conjunctionwith social goals like sociability, approval, status and
power (Granovetter, 1992). Individual economic action is not about
self-interest alone, but can also involve reciprocity and redis-
tribution (Mackintosh & Gilson, 2002). Market expressions, there-
fore, reﬂect settlements negotiated by human actors who are
motivated by multiple goals and inﬂuenced by their embedded
location in social relations and contexts as deﬁned by broader po-
litical economies.
A more nuanced sociological approach to understanding how
markets function is critical for health systems in Asia and in other
low and middle income contexts. Private health providers are
dominant, but the complex dynamics that deﬁne their discretion or
dependency within the health systems, markets and communities
in which they work require further investigation (Kamat, 2001;
Kielmann et al., 2005; Krause, 2001; Sheikh & George, 2010). The
contradictions and ambiguities of contemporary health markets in
unregulated contexts are particularly relevant to informal providers
(Bloom, Standing, & Lloyd, 2008; Peters & Bloom, 2012).
Informal providers are increasingly being recognised as major
providers in the south Asian region (Ahmed, Hossain, &
Chowdhury, 2009; Rashid, Akram, & Standing, 2011). In India,
these providers have long been recognised as playing a critical role
(Neumann, Bhatia, Andrews, & Murphy, 1971) and historically
outnumbered formal providers. The 1881 census recorded 12,620
physicians and surgeons, 582 army hospital medics and 60,678
unqualiﬁed practitioners (GOI 1883 cited by Duggal, 2005).
Although informal providers represent a network that outnumbers
providers with government-recognised degrees in rural areas, their
numbers are still insufﬁcient considering the volume of rural health
needs. A study in Uttar Pradesh had to cover three times the villages
originally planned in order to reach their desired sample of RMPs
(Rohde & Viswanathan, 1995: p. 42). Similarly, Ashtekar and
Mankad (2001: p. 448) found that 84% of villages in Nashik dis-
trict, Maharashtra, had no resident private provider e not even an
informal one.
In India, the terminology to describe informal allopathic pro-
viders or RMPs can be confusing. RMP used to stand for Registered
Medical Practitioner. Prior to independence, the colonial govern-
ment began registering unqualiﬁed rural practitioners in 1933,
requiring a certiﬁcate from a revenue ofﬁcer attesting to their
successful practice for ten years (Rohde & Viswanathan, 1995) or
their apprenticeship with other experienced providers (Jeffery,
1988). Today the only doctors qualiﬁed to practise allopathy in
India, and who are eligible for registration, are those who hold
MBBS degrees. Nonetheless, the term RMP persists in India and
permission to practise allopathic medicine is not effectively con-
trolled by the state. For example, Ashtekar and Mankad (2001:
p. 451) listed 43 different degrees reported by rural medical
practitioners in Nashik district, Maharashtra. This is beyond the
degrees that the government recognises for medicine: MBBS
(Allopathy), BDS (Dentistry), BAMS (Ayurveda), BHMS (Homoeo-
pathy), and BUMS (Unani). In our study, we deﬁned RMPs as
private providers who provide allopathic curative care without
having any of the degrees for medicine recognised by the Gov-
ernment of India.
Cross and MacGregor (2010) highlight the problematic as-
sumptions around deﬁning informal providers, the context of their
biomedical and economic transactions, and their networks with
other providers. They argue for a more nuanced understanding ofRMP practice. One step in that direction is made by Ingram,
Sudhinaraset, Lofthouse, and Montagu (2012), who deﬁne infor-
mal providers as those who: 1) receive payments from patients
rather than institutions, usually in an undocumented fashion, 2)
receive little or no ofﬁcially recognised training, 3) operate outside
the purview of regulations, registration or any ofﬁcial oversight,
and 4) may be part of professional associations that do not have
certiﬁcation or regulatory authority. Based on this deﬁnition, their
review found that these providers represented a signiﬁcant pro-
portion of the health sector varying from half to more than half of
all providers in Asia and Africa and generally had high patient loads
(Ingram et al., 2012).
Informal providers are increasingly recognised as an important
part of health systems in various contexts (Ingram et al., 2012;
Konde-Lule et al., 2010; Kruk, Rockers, Varpilah, & Macauley, 2011;
Omaswa, 2006; Onwujekwe, Onoka, Uzochukwu, & Hanson, 2011).
In the south Asian context, the poor clinical quality of care rendered
by informal providers is well established (Ahmed & Hossain, 2007;
Chakraborty & Frick, 2002). While training interventions have most
frequently been used to address this problem (Ingram et al., 2012),
a combination of interventions that change the institutional re-
lationships, incentives and accountabilities of these providers is
recommended (Shah, Brieger, & Peters, 2010). Understanding the
contextual basis of the institutional relationships that support their
knowledge, livelihoods and reputations is critical (Bloom et al.,
2011). Following these recent reviews that argue for a more con-
textualised understanding of informal providers, and those who
have described medical pluralism in India (Khare, 1996; Pinto,
2004), we detail the social proﬁle of these providers, including
how their practice is embedded in and regulated by their relations
with formal health systems, markets and communities in which
they work and live.
Methods
Data for this paper is derived from a research site comprising 60
villages in Koppal district, northern Karnataka, India, together with
the larger villages and towns to which its inhabitants routinely
travel for health care. With just over 1 million people, Koppal dis-
trict has the worst development indicators within Karnataka (Sen,
Iyer, & George, 2008). As a drought-prone agrarian economy, it has
high levels of poverty, illiteracy, seasonal migration, and adverse
caste and gender hierarchies. Caste hierarchies are based on the
notion of ritual purity inherited at birth that restricts inter-
marriage and inter-dining. The caste system, which traditionally
deﬁned occupational groups, remains a powerful determinant of
access to resources, as well as discrimination and violence, even if
its boundaries can be blurred and contested.
Three data sources are used. First, a household survey in 2002 on
health care utilisation for self-reported morbidity from a circular
systematic random sample of 12.5% (or 1920 of 15,360) households
in the project area. Second, a private provider census in 2004 in the
60 villages within the project area and surrounding 11 market
villages and commercial towns, which collected data on informal
providers i.e., RMPs with no degrees or with claims to unrecognised
degrees (Box 1), traditional birth attendants, spiritual and tradi-
tional healers, provision stores selling tablets, unlicensed medical
stores that serve as informal pharmacies, as well as formal pro-
viders (i.e., licensed medical stores (pharmacies) and laboratories,
private doctors with MBBS, BDS, BAMS, BHMS, BUMS degrees).
Among informal providers, this paper focuses on RMPs. Third, daily
ﬁeld notes recorded during nine months of ethnographic study on
health service provision in 2004, as well as from unstructured
observations and interactions with RMPs to this date during
training sessions on maternal health care.
Box 1. Degrees found in our census not recognised by the
government as permitting autonomous medical practice.
RMP Certificate, RHMP (Rural Homoeopathic Medical
Practice), DHM (Diploma in Homoeopathic Medicine),
MBHS (Diploma in Medicine, Biochemistry and Homoeo-
pathic Science), various forms of Ayurvedic Basic degree
(Diploma, Doctorate), DIASM (Diploma Indian Allopathic
System and Medicine), MDAS (Medical Diploma in Ayur-
vedic Service), DSAS (Diploma Shudha Ayurvedic Surgery),
BEMS (Bachelors of Electro Homoeopathic Medicine and
Surgery), BSAM (Bachelors Shudha Ayurvedic Medicine),
GCIM (Graduate Certificate in Integrated Medicine), LAMS
(Licentiate in Ayurvedic Medicine and Surgery) and LMS
(Licence of Integrated Ayurveda and Medicine).
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long, excluding the time taken to obtain informed consent, and
canvassed in the local language, Kannada. Each completed inter-
view form, including detailed notes for qualitative segments, was
reviewed by the authors on the same day as the interview. Periodic
review meetings were also held with all investigators to reﬂect on
ﬁndings. All qualitative segments were subsequently translated
into English.
Interview data along with observation notes were reviewed and
grouped into broad categories before being manually coded. They
were then analysed using the ‘framework’ approach, which struc-
tures enquiry prior to data collection while accommodating addi-
tional research questions that emerge through data collection
(Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). A priori themes drawn from the provider
instrument included location of practice, provider demographics
and training, treatments provided, preventive/public health activ-
ities, fees, referral, motivation, livelihoods, political activities, pro-
fessional association activities, linkages with medical
representatives. Emergent issues included availability, demon-
strating results, people contact, delayed payment, social sanctions
and arose from interviewees’ responses. Finally, analytical themes
based on patterning of emergent themes were also identiﬁed as
health system and community embeddedness, reciprocity and
trust. Descriptive tabulations of the quantitative data together with
the qualitative datawere reviewed in order to understand recurring
and emerging themes and nuances in the data.
Efforts were made to ensure that a multiplicity of RMPs and
their views were represented, including outliers or discordantTable 1
Population estimates of type and location of ﬁrst provider sought for short-term ailmen
Location of ﬁrst provider Total At home Same village
Type of ﬁrst provider N % % %
RMP 3880 42.8 13.6 60.5
Government primary health care 1825 20.1 6.8 16.9
Private solo doctor 1401 15.4 0.0 0.0
Provision store 561 6.2 9.0 12.2
Government hospital 357 3.9 0.0 0.1
Private hospital 264 2.9 0.0 0.0
Religious healer 215 2.4 22.6 1.8
Traditional healer 213 2.3 20.6 2.7
Medical shop 180 2.0 0.0 3.8
Self 56 0.6 9.0 0.6
Relative, neighbour 49 0.6 11.5 0.0
Other 48 0.5 6.8 0.6
Dai 16 0.2 0.0 0.4
No response 8 0.1 0.0 0.2
Total 9073 100.0 100.0 100.0responses that were further examined and contextualised through
the analysis. Triangulation took place by comparing quantitative
and qualitative responses from the census, comparing census re-
sponses with observation, and comparing observation across in-
vestigators. In addition, initial ﬁndings were shared with project
stakeholders for their review and validation. Research activities
were approved by an institutional review board constituted at the
national institution supporting this research.
Results
We present our results in three main sections. We ﬁrst outline
the nature of health care seeking and provision based on household
survey and provider census data. We then focus on RMPs, clarifying
who they are socio-demographically, their qualiﬁcations and pro-
fessional networks, before describing how they perceive the social
relations that underpin the informal markets in which they
practise.
Health care provision and utilisation
Our census of private providers in 2004 covered 546 providers
within the 60 villages in our project site and a remaining 264
providers in the surrounding 11 market villages and commercial
towns with 3 refusals overall. Of the 546 providers in the project
site, 47 were RMPs and 1 was a doctor with a government-
recognised degree in Ayurveda. The others were spiritual healers
(35), traditional healers (133), traditional birth attendants (178) and
provision stores (152). In contrast, the four largest commercial
towns contributed 36% of 91 RMPs, 93% of 42 private doctors, 84% of
the 70 medical stores and 100% of the 8 laboratories in the census.
Out of the 42 private doctors interviewed, only 13 (30%) wereMBBS
doctors.
While RMPs, government health providers (health assistants,
sub-centres, PHCs and CHCs) and private solo doctors constitute the
ﬁrst port of call for those seeking treatment for short-term ail-
ments, the location for seeking such care is markedly different
(Table 1). Treatment undertaken at home is mainly by spiritual and
traditional healers, some RMPs, and provision stores. Treatment
sought outside the home, but in the same village or surrounding
villages, is predominantly by RMPs, followed by government pri-
mary health care services, with RMPs more likely to be available in
the same village as the patient. It is only for treatment at the sub-
district, district or beyond, for which private doctors or govern-
ment and private hospitals are selected.ts.
Other village Sub-district capital District capital Other district/state
% % % %
51.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
37.1 7.4 4.0 1.7
0.0 74.2 39.7 72.6
0.9 0.6 0.0 1.7
5.0 12.1 16.1 5.1
2.6 3.0 36.2 17.2
1.8 0.6 0.0 1.7
0.9 0.6 0.0 0.0
0.0 1.4 4.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Who are they?
Almost all RMPs were men aged 40 on average (range: 22e81
years). Three out of ﬁve were upper caste and a similar propor-
tion had a standard 12 education (high school). Although two out of
three RMPs practised in the district where they were born and
raised, they tended to work in villages other than their own
(Table 2). RMPs with limited endowments (by way of training or
caste status) were particularly inclined to migrate for work away
from their native villages, but remaining within the state.
RMPs reported addressing mainly outpatient conditions,
whether they were infectious, chronic or socially sensitive. Most
reported treating malaria, typhoid, coughs and colds, asthma,
vomiting and diarrhoea, white discharge, jaundice, headaches,
stomach pain, joint and body pain. One or two RMPs reported
treating cholera, pus ﬁlled infections, paralysis due to stroke,
rheumatism, arthritis, allergic bronchitis, diabetes, anaemia, eye
problems, haemorrhoids, urinary tract infections, hydrocoele, sex-
ually transmitted diseases, skin disease, mental health problems
and infertility.
Although just under a half of RMPs reported earning income
from non-medical ventures (Table 2), many have alternative sour-
ces of income. Qualitative responses and observations revealed that
RMPs cultivated land, managed real estate or transport assets and/
or taught in local schools or colleges. Those that remained in their
native villages and/or were upper caste, were more likely to report
being economically secure. RMPs also reported having family
members who earned salaries (as anganwadi, railway, or factoryTable 2
Characteristics of RMPs.
Characteristics RMP without
degrees
RMP with
unrecognized
degrees
Total
N ¼ 49 N ¼ 42 N ¼ 91 %
Origin
Koppal district 37 25 62 68
Other northern districts 12 13 25 27
Southern districts 0 1 1 1
Other states 0 3 3 3
Caste
Upper caste 28 29 57 63
Middle caste 12 7 19 21
Schedule caste/schedule tribe 3 4 7 8
Christian/Muslim 6 2 8 9
Main source of training
Apprenticeship with relatives 18 3 21 23
Apprenticeship with providers 27 8 35 38
Technical training (some degree) 1 31 32 35
Other unspeciﬁed 3 0
Visited by a medical representative/drug salesman in the last month
Yes 14 23 37 41
Unknown 1 0
Professional association membership
Yes 17 17 34 38
Unknown 0 1
Working in native place
Yes 19 10 29 32
Have another source of income not based on medical practice
Yes 22 19 41 46
Unknown 0 1workers), or who were engaged in commerce of some kind
(clothing, welding, cement, garage and medical shops).
Only 38% of RMPs reported being members of an RMP associa-
tion (Table 2). Among those RMPs who did report being members,
most mentioned associations serving to improve their medical in-
formation base, with only a few also describing it as a space to
discuss problems related to their profession. It is hard to assess the
political strength of RMP associations. One district ofﬁcial com-
mented that RMPs were highly organised and therefore able to
continue practising despite their illegality. Although many RMPs
report struggling for their day-to-day earnings, some were
observed to actively participate in party politics, while others were
part of the social elite in their villages.
Training
Out of 91 RMPs, 49 had no degrees and 42 had degrees not
recognised by the government (Box 1). RMPs in Koppal reported
valuing training as critical to their practice. One of these RMPs from
a small village reported, “Today whatever type of RMP we may be,
we have to study. We bring new books and consult well-
experienced doctors” (RMP23). RMPs without any degrees mainly
learnt their trade from apprenticeships with other providers or
relatives, while those with degrees mainly learnt from courses. In
addition, those with degrees also learnt from hands-on experience.
One of them who practised in the district capital reported, “I have
learnt through my education in Electro Homoeopathy, my experi-
ence in a medical store, two years working in a government hos-
pital and through children’s health training from the Rotary club”
(RMP 61). Although he did not reveal what ‘post’ he held in the
government hospital or what constituted ‘training’ from the Rotary
club, for him they represented important sources of authoritative
medical expertise.
Although the health providers that trained RMPs usually
belonged to the private sector, ﬁve RMPs mentioned receiving
training from government doctors. One of these RMPs learnt from
his experience in a remote PHC that is periodically understaffed and
often unmanned. He reported, “When I go to the PHC, if the patient
is injured and the doctor has to do stitches, then the doctor asks for
my help. I helpwith putting the bandages on, doing the stitches and
washing the wounds. In these unavoidable circumstances, they ask
for our help and I help them a little” (RMP38). In other instances,
RMPs were found practising in government services that had suf-
ﬁcient staff in place.
RMPs being trained in the private sector provided assistance
during particularly busy clinics or with less technically demanding
tasks. One of these RMPs from a small village goes every Sunday for
training in a private clinic. He explained, “I go to the private doctor,
because he has more patients. Mostly I give injections and the
private doctor gives me bus fare and fees in return” (RMP 54). In
general, apprenticeships are seen as mutually beneﬁcial for both
formally qualiﬁed providers (whether government or private), who
require cheap and earnest labour, and for RMPs who seek oppor-
tunities to learn medicine unofﬁcially.
Service networks
While apprenticeships provided training, they also fostered
networks among providers. Overall, only a third of the RMPs,
especially those without degrees, referred patients to government
services (Table 3). As one of these RMPs from a large town
explained, “If it’s a major ailment involving more syringes or ex-
penses, I send them to the government hospital” (RMP56). Gov-
ernment services can also be relied upon to provide diagnostic
services that an RMP cannot afford to invest in. One interviewer
reported that an RMPworking in a large town “does his blood smear
tests for malaria in the government hospital and asks patients to go
Table 3
Nature of RMP practice.
Nature of practice RMP without
degrees
RMP with
unrecognized
degrees
Total N
N ¼ 49 N ¼ 42 N ¼ 91 %
Main location of practice
Commercial area 9 21 30 33
Residential area 37 17 44 49
Outskirts 3 3 6 7
Unknown 0 1
Fixed timings for services
Yes 16 22 38 42
Travelling to other villages to provide services
Yes 30 19 49 54
Provision of drugs in addition to prescription
Provides 100% drugs of
prescribed drugs
3 5 8 9
Provides 75% of prescribed drugs 2 1 3 3
Provides 50% of prescribed drugs 22 6 28 31
Provides 25% of prescribed drugs 10 22 32 35
Provides 0% of prescribed drugs 12 8 20 22
Referral
Mainly government 20 8 28 32
Mainly private 21 26 47 53
Other 7 6 13 15
Unknown 1 2
Main motivation for work location
Native place 21 12 33 37
Good earnings 17 15 32 36
Political contact 4 7 11 12
People contact 6 2 8 9
To help others 0 0 0 0
Other 1 5 6 7
Unknown 0 1
Main way of helping poor patients who cannot pay
Defer payment 37 35 72 87
Discount 4 4 8 10
Refer 1 2 3 4
No care 0 0 0 0
Unknown 3 1
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supplies them with government tuberculosis tablets afterwards”
(RMP 60).
These referral networks serve as important information chan-
nels. As one RMP from a small village explained, “I send patients to
this doctor in the big town, his relative runs the Blood Test Centre.
Hewill check and send the patients there. Then he sends them back
to me for further treatment. I don’t get any monetary beneﬁt from
him, but he gives me information about the condition free of cost”
(RMP19).
Apart from sustaining continued learning, these referral link-
ages also guide patients in their efforts to access an otherwise
overwhelming plethora of higher-level health services in unfamil-
iar towns. Not all of this behaviour is altruistic. In some instances,
RMPs are ﬁnancially rewarded for referring patients to private
clinics. As one RMP practising in a village close to the district capital
explained, “If any complicated patients come, I take them to Dr.X’s
clinic. If the bill comes up to Rs.3000e4000, I get Rs.500e600”
(RMP8). Both private and government doctors were reported by
RMPs to offer ﬁnancial kick-backs.
Some RMPs strategically attempt to consolidate their business
by creating service networks that link their treatment withprovision stores, medical shops or diagnostic centres within their
families. As one RMP from a large town explained, “After my son
completes his MBBS, I will make himwork in a government PHC for
10 years, after which I intend putting up a nursing home. I want
a medical store for my other son and I also wish to set up my own
laboratory” (RMP83). Government services in these instances
served as a launching pad, subsidising efforts to develop more
established private services.Informal market and community pressures
Setting up practice
Being able to practice in their native village was an attractive
proposition for RMPs, but only a third of themwere able to actually
do so (Tables 2 and 3). An equally important consideration was
income (Table 3). Many RMPs cited ‘good earnings’ as their main
reason for relocation. An RMPwhomigrated from a village to a sub-
district headquarter said, “I came here for the sake of ﬁlling my
stomach and as the income is good” (RMP88).
Social contacts also played a critical role for those RMPs who
relocated beyond their native village. One of the RMPwhomigrated
for work said, “Known people were here. They used to come to my
uncle for treatment. They told me that there was no doctor here.
That is why I came” (RMP10). ‘People contact’ and/or ‘political
contact’ were therefore important considerations that determined
the location of RMPs (Table 3).
No RMP listed ‘helping people’ as the main motivating factor for
their current location. Although four RMPs, including two upper
caste RMPs, did mention a sense of social duty in their qualitative
responses, philanthropy or social work was not a primary motiva-
tor. Two of these providers were involved in local party politics.
Being available
Cultivating social connections was viewed as an essential pre-
requisite in the decision to relocate, and also to ensure a client
base for their practice. One RMP explained how he could not adjust
to one village because, “There, all the doctors should follow the
RMP method. This means going from door to door to give treat-
ment. People will not come to the clinic” (RMP45). More RMPs
without degrees travelled to other villages for service than those
with degrees (Table 3).
In addition to being available everywhere, RMPs were also
expected to be available around the clock, especially those without
degrees (Table 3). An RMP without any degree explained, “If we ﬁx
timings for our clinic, it’s an insult to the patient. One cannot know
when one is going to fall sick. Only if we are ready to give treatment
whenever it is needed, we will be known as good doctors. If I sleep
for two nights in a week, I am lucky” (RMP57). By making them-
selves available at all times, RMPs try to respond to the unpre-
dictability of illness and to the needs of poor patients whose
livelihoods depend on getting better fast.
Demonstrating results
RMPs reported being buffeted with unrealistic expectations
regarding instant cures, which they negotiated in a number of
ways. One tactic was to counsel or mollify their patients. When this
failed, they resorted to scare tactics. An upper caste RMP reported,
“A person came complaining of a cold, so I gave him a prescription.
The next day he came and shouted at me: ‘You have given me Rs.20
medicine for a mere cold and it has not got better.’ Then I told him
that without my treatment, he had chances of getting typhoid. All
doctors do this, because people don’t believe us” (RMP72). RMP
responses indicate that the lack of regulatory standards is a prob-
lem for both patients and providers.
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RMP without any degree noted, “If we ask a patient with high fever
to drink cumin and ginger solution, they won’t bother to return to
us again for help. We have to give them injections and tablets”
(RMP25). Another RMP with a degree explained more bluntly, “We
should not practise allopathy, but if we don’t, our practice won’t
run” (RMP73). As the ﬁnancial and professional security of pro-
viders depends onmeeting patient demand for quick relief, this has
led to the wide acceptance of cross-practice.
In the context of unregulated markets, providers are under
pressure to provide visible forms of treatment. More RMPs without
degrees than those with degrees dispensed at least 50% of medi-
cines they prescribed (Table 3). One RMP reported, “.we require
themoney. If we do not give injections, people say that the doctor is
not good. That is why we give an injection and take Rs.10” (RMP55).
Only two RMPs expressed concerns about the pressure to provide
medicines and injections regardless of need. They could afford to do
so, as they were cultivators of irrigated land and not ﬁnancially
dependent on their health work.
Defending boundaries
Some RMPs were more circumspect about their expertise and
careful not to generate expectations they were not able to fulﬁl. As
one RMP from a small village explained, “I do not treat serious
patients.I can ﬁght with disease, but not with the God of Death
(Yama). In case the patient dies, the community will blame us”
(RMP39). Another RMP from a large market village stated, “Even if I
am conﬁdent that I can give treatment, I send serious patients
elsewhere. If something goes wrong, we are the ones who will get
a bad name” (RMP87). These responses indicate that one way for
RMPs to guard their reputations is to selectively provide services to
those who can be easily cured or attended to.
This is not necessarily a negative practice and can reﬂect pro-
fessional ethics through a kind of self-restraint. As one RMP from
a small village said, “Some doctors hesitate to refuse patients. Only
after wasting half the patient’s money, do these doctors ﬁnally tell
them to go to bigger cities. That iswhyeven ifwe lose our respect,we
tell them from the beginning that it is not possible to treat them
here” (RMP6). Recognition by RMPs of the limits of their skills is
corroborated by responses related to emergency care. Although
RMPs reported attending to emergencies like problem deliveries,
heart attacks, injuries, suicide attempts, snakebites and seizures,
most RMPs reported responding bygivingﬁrst aid and then referring
patients to government facilities or to hospitals out of the district.
Negotiating fees
When asked how they respond to patients who are poor and
whomay not be able to pay for their services, RMPs stated that they
gave free treatment. This would seem to indicate a philanthropic
orientation, yet the qualitative data revealed that 87% of the RMPs
meant that they would take money from patients later (Table 3). An
RMP reported, “If they do not give money, I treat them for free and
afterwards I take money from them” (RMP22). What is reported by
RMPs as ‘free treatment’ actually entails delayed payment.
These delayed payments were not concessions that RMPs made,
but were presented to them as fait accompli by their patients. An
RMP said, “I give them treatment and have to take whatever they
give or keep quiet if they do not pay” (RMP15). Observation notes
by ﬁeld investigators and the lead author also described that RMPs
do not explicitly ask patients for money.
Fees are implicitly understood, not as a one-time exchange, but
as part of a series of interactions. An RMP reported, “I don’t like to
go to other villages, as I have to spend on bus fare and take medi-
cines. But when we give medicines, some people do not pay. If we
do not go after them, that money will not come at all” (RMP76). Inthis way, delayed payments sometimes serve to bind relationships
in ways that ensure continuity of service delivery.
This fait accompli perceived by RMPs is also due to the stark
subsistence of patients in this region, for whom survival is
enmeshed with debt. Since RMPs rarely keep records, payment is
made according to informal trust relationships that follow the
patterns of village life. One RMP reported a high level of trust: “We
give them free treatment. We take money if they pay, otherwise
not. Here many people go for daily wages. When they get earnings
they will pay. Nobody will cheat. They treat us like their own family
members andwe also look after themwith the same love. If we visit
them during lunch time, some people will not let us go until we
have our lunch” (RMP10).
Trust by RMPs in their patient’s memories about debts incurred
cannot be avoided, as RMPs reported not being in a position to deny
treatment if fees were not paid. An RMP conceded, “We cannot
demand any ﬁxed amount from the people in the villages. If we
insist on a ﬁxed amount, from the next day onwards people will
stop coming. Then we will have to sit swatting ﬂies. Our practice
will end and we will have to leave” (RMP23). At the same time,
RMPs also viewed trust in the ability of patients to pay back as risky.
Another RMP stated, “If a doctor is very intelligent and able to cure
any type of disease, people will say his treatment is good. But no
doctor will stay for a long time because people are very rough. After
taking treatment, they will ask for credit. I have yet to recover
Rs.8,000. From where can I raise this money?” (RMP29). As RMPs
perceived social constraints against pressuring people to pay, they
felt that their practices were not as proﬁtable as they would have
liked them to be.
In order to have more ﬁnancial security, RMPs at times actively
cultivated closer relations through their fee structure. One of these
RMPs reported, “For house visits to regular patients I charge Rs.10,
but for others I charge Rs.20” (RMP79). However, having closer
relationships can also lead to greater social constraints against
recovering fees, especially for those practising in their native vil-
lage/town. One such RMP noted, “If the medicine costs Rs.30, pa-
tients give only Rs.15. We do not earn anything, because we do not
charge the full amount, as all the patients are known people”
(RMP54). These responses from RMPs highlight how being
embedded in communities has beneﬁts, but that after reaching
a threshold, being embedded is also a trade-off that constrains their
practice. We discuss this in more detail below.
Community support and belligerence
Some RMPs asserted that they faced no problems from the
communities in which they lived. These same RMPs were local
elected representatives or came from upper caste families and were
part of the village elite. Other less privileged RMPs reported various
challenges related to working in communities, reﬂecting how del-
icately balanced their position in villages was. Several of these
RMPs reported being warned by the police or other government
authorities against practising medicine. In such instances, com-
munity support can counter unpredictable government enforce-
ment efforts. An RMP noted, “Once there was a police complaint
against me and the police came. But the village people told the
police to leave me alone, because if there is any problem at night,
there is no one in this place to help them” (RMP25). Communities
do rally around the RMPs they trust, even if it is also because they
have few medical alternatives to turn to in some villages.
Community support for an RMP can be conditional, however.
Communities do seek retribution against RMPs who are seen to
have caused harm to people. While undertaking the census, one
RMP was not interviewed as he had been driven out of the village
several months earlier for having injected a child who subsequently
developed severe complications. Another RMP noted, “Once an
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the RMP” (RMP50). Another RMP reported, “One person had a heart
attack and despite my pumping on his chest, he expired. The vil-
lagers started spreading rumours that I had done something to kill
the patient” (RMP89). These responses show that communities
deploy strategies ranging from rumour, police cases, even violence
to counteract what they consider bad clinical practice by RMPs,
even if some RMPs belong to the village elite from being higher
caste or from having political connections.
RMPs reportedly were judicious in their responses to the
problems presented by particular patients or communities. In
addition, RMPs proactively protected their social reputation by
courting favour with village elites, especially since elected repre-
sentatives were mentioned as mediators in situations of contro-
versy. One middle caste RMP reported, “When I ﬁrst came to this
village, the panchayat members were grumbling a lot, so I used to
treat them on a priority basis without charging them” (RMP3).
In extreme circumstances, RMPs also used the police to protect
their own interests. The same RMP said, “I started by giving free
treatment to panchayat members, but gradually the number of
people requiring free treatment increased. That is why I made
a police complaint and since the police came to beat up the culprits,
there are no longer any problems” (RMP3). As local police are
known to favour of village elites, turning to the police for help
demonstrated this RMP’s own powerful social position.
Discussion
RMPs are a critical resource for households as a primary point
of care, referral and advice. While operating on the periphery of
formal health systems, their training and referral networks are
intimately integrated with qualiﬁed providers in both government
and private sectors. While unregulated market pressures drive
RMPs to sell allopathic curative commodities or make home visits
around the clock, they also report being circumspect about
restricting their practice to ‘simple’ cases. However, even with
‘simple’ cases, RMPs reported that their ‘medical’ expertise could
be called into question. RMPs without any degrees seem more
vulnerable to these pressures than their colleagues with unrec-
ognised degrees.
In addition to being embedded in formal health systems and
unregulated market dynamics, RMPs, unlike other private allo-
pathic providers, are deeply marked by their social relationships
with the communities they are based in. Trust relationships
emerge, as a function of familiarity and rapport, as well as due to
quid pro quo bargains that stem from the RMPs’ vulnerability and
a lack of alternatives. Being embedded in social relationships, RMPs
are inhibited from formally charging fees or refusing services, even
though they are also personally motivated by proﬁt. Patients can
defer payments in ways that RMPs cannot fully control. Commu-
nities can also threaten the reputation of RMPs through rumour or
retaliate with violence. Nonetheless, RMPs are not entirely
defenceless. They also can deploy political strategies or fall back on
their elite social status to expand their client base and protect their
interests.
Our data draws from baseline research for a safe motherhood
project that was not intended to test conceptual models regarding
RMP practice. Social desirability bias in terms of not disclosing
alternative income and providing free treatment became apparent
when triangulating across data sources. While our interview data
was collected in 2002 and 2004, the realities that they represent
remain relevant today, as validated by our more recent ﬁeld ob-
servations and by other research from India (Gautham, Binnendijk,
Koren, & Dror, 2011). Our observations while tracking pregnant
women, deliveries and obstetric complications in the project siteindicates that the role of RMPs has reduced in terms of their pro-
vision of injections (oxytocin, vitamins) for home deliveries, due to
the increase in institutional deliveries prompted by government
cash incentives. However, their role in providing timely access to
curative outpatient care has remained constant.
Our research illuminates the social context, relations and varied
motivations that underpin RMPs roles in Koppal’s unregulated
health care markets, demonstrating that despite operating illegally
and informally, RMP expertise, service networks, reputations and
success are deeply embedded in the formal health systems and
communities to which they belong. For the many villages with no
resident government or private doctor available at night, RMPs
provide treatments that reassure patients. In other instances, RMPs
are complicit in irrational health care consumption that further
indebts and endangers patients. Poor quality of care and the con-
sequences of unregulated markets are issues that plague India’s
complex health system as a whole (Das, 2011). Despite the con-
currence on the detrimental effects of unregulated markets on
health care, research that elucidates the perspectives of providers
operating in such environments is rare (Kamat, 2001; Kielmann
et al., 2005; Nichter & Nichter, 1996; Pinto, 2004; Sheikh &
George, 2010). Our research, grounded in sociological analysis of
markets, reveals both the socially responsive and mercenary char-
acteristics of RMP social relations, motivations and practice. Any
reforms to improve effective access to quality care must consider
these nuances within their social context, rather than assume that
RMPs are a homogenous group and that markets unilaterally skew
provider incentives in any one direction. Consideration of the social
status of providers and their membership within health system,
market and community relationships is critical to understanding
how informal markets function.Conclusion
The unregulated nature of private practice is a well-recognised
phenomenon in many low-income health systems. However, the
informal nature of RMP practice does not mean that they are
completely free agents. RMP training and service networks are
strongly linked to other government and private providers.
Although villagers respect RMPs as doctors, who have the power to
heal, RMPs cannot act with impunity. For many, life as an RMP is an
uncertain and negotiated balance between various community
pressures that mediate how payments are made, how favour is
ensured and what happens when trust is violated. Although con-
cern has been expressed about the poor quality of care and com-
mercialising pressures of unregulated markets, very little research
has explored how providers negotiate these pressures from the
health systems and communities where their services are based.
This article hopes to contribute to the emerging interest in informal
providers, by illuminating the contribution of other disciplines to
understanding health markets as institutional arenas with het-
erogeneous actors marked bymultiple social relations, linkages and
nuanced motivations.Acknowledgements
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